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| − | category=Fact Sheet | Animals
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| − | <li>one</li>
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| − | <li>two</li>
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| − | <li>one</li>
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| − | <li>two</li>
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>EDU
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>My take
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>All philosophical frameworks lead to veganism</li>
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| − | <li>No philosophical framework is required for the argument for veganism</li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Philosophers
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Jeremy Bentham
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Biographical
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>English philosopher 1748 - 1832</li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Philosophy
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Hedonistic utilitarian.</li>
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| − | <li>He argued that it was the ability to suffer rather than the ability to reason
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| − | that should provide the benchmark, or what he called the "insuperable line", of
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| − | how we treat other animals. He pointed out that if rationality was the main
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| − | criterion of who ought to have rights and how we treated other animals than many
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| − | humans would for similar reasons be treated as objects in much the same way as
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| − | animals, for example babies and the mentally disabled."<br>http://think-differently-about-sheep.com/Animal_rights_a_History_Jeremy_Bentham.htm
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Quotes
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>"The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which
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| − | breathes..."
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>"The question is not can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer?"
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| − | <br>In a footnote in Bentham, J. 1789. An Introduction to the Principles of
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| − | Morals and Legislation. Chapter xvii.)
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Full quote in context
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>referring to the limited degree of legal protection given to
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| − | slaves in the French West Indies by the Code Noir, in 1789 he
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| − | wrote:
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>"The day has been, I am sad to say in many places it is not yet
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| − | past, in which the greater part of the species, under the
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| − | denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly
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| − | upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior
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| − | races of animals are still. The day may come when the rest of
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| − | the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could
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| − | have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The
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| − | French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is
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| − | no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to
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| − | the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised
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| − | that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the
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| − | termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient
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| − | for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is
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| − | it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
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| − | reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown
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| − | horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a
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| − | more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or
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| − | even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what
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| − | would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can
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| − | they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its
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| − | protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when
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| − | humanity will extend its mantle over everything which
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| − | breathes..."
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>The capacity to suffer entitles one to an equal consideration of
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| − | interests.
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>“Each to count for one and none for more than one."
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Equality: the interests of every being affected by an action are to be
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| − | taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of
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| − | any other being.
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>"The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights
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| − | which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny."
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Impact
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>"It was during the 1800s that an increase in consideration and respect for the
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| − | rights of animals grew, along with the idea that animals should be treated
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| − | differently. Much of this change in attitude was due to the influence of Jeremy
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| − | Bentham who changed the philosophies of many people by changing the way they
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| − | looked at animals. Rather than regarding them as inferior to human beings
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| − | because of their inability to reason, Bentham applied ethical utilitarianism to
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| − | animals. He said that because animals suffer, their happiness and wellbeing is
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| − | relevant and that it is the capacity for suffering that gives all sentient
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| − | beings the right to equal consideration."<br>http://think-differently-about-sheep.com/Animal_rights_a_History_Jeremy_Bentham.htm
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Peter Singer
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Philosophy
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Has described himself as a hedonistic utilatarian.</li>
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| − | <li>"Equal consideration of interests"
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>The term "equal consideration of interests" first appeared in Peter
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| − | Singer's Practical Ethics.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>A moral principle that states that one should both include all affected
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| − | interests when calculating the rightness of an action and weigh those
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| − | interests equally.<br>Marco E.L. Guidi, <a
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| − | href="http://etudes-benthamiennes.revues.org/182), Revue d’études benthamiennes, vol. 4 (2008">“Everybody
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| − | to count for one, nobody for more than one”: The Principle of Equal
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| − | Consideration of Interests from Bentham to Pigou</a></li>
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| − | <li>If all beings, not just human, are included as having interests that
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| − | must be considered, then the principle of equal consideration of
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| − | interests opposes not only racism and sexism, but also speciesism.
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Equal consideration is not equal treatment:
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>"The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to
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| − | another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the
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| − | same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we
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| − | should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups.
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| − | The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical
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| − | treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for
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| − | different beings may lead to different treatment."<br>Animal Liberation
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Rejected rights as a necessary component of a moral philosophy.
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>"These claims [about rights] are irrelevant to the case for Animal
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| − | Liberation. The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand."
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Although Bentham speaks of “rights” in the passage I have quoted, the
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| − | argument is really about equality rather than about rights. Indeed, in a
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| − | different passage, Bentham famously described “natural rights” as
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| − | “nonsense” and “natural and imprescriptable rights” as “nonsense upon
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| − | stilts.” He talked of <b>moral rights as a shorthand way of referring to
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| − | protections that people and animals morally ought to have;</b> but
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| − | the real weight of the moral argument does not rest on the assertion of
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| − | the existence of the right, for this in turn has to be justified on the
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| − | basis of the possibilities for suffering and happiness. In this way <b>we
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| − | can argue for equality for animals without getting embroiled in
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| − | philosophical controversies about the ultimate nature of rights.</b><br>Animal
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| − | Liberation
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>"What we must do is bring nonhuman animals within our sphere of moral concern
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| − | and cease to treat their lives as expendable for whatever trivial purposes we
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| − | may have."<br>AL
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Did not believe that all lives are of equal worth
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>"I conclude, then, that a rejection of speciesism does not imply that
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| − | all lives are of equal worth. While self-awareness, the capacity to
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| − | think ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity
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| − | for meaningful relations with others and so on are not relevant to the
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| − | question of inflicting pain— since pain is pain, whatever other
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| − | capacities, beyond the capacity to feel pain, the being may have— these
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| − | capacities are relevant to the question of taking life.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable
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| − | of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of
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| − | communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being
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| − | without these capacities.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>To see the difference between the issues of inflicting pain and taking
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| − | life, consider how we would choose within our own species. If we had to
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| − | choose to save the life of a normal human being or an intellectually
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| − | disabled human being, we would probably choose to save the life of a
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| − | normal human being; but if we had to choose between preventing pain in
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| − | the normal human being or the intellectually disabled one— imagine that
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| − | both have received painful but superficial injuries, and we only have
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| − | enough painkiller for one of them— it is not nearly so clear how we
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| − | ought to choose.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li></li>
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| − | <li>Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal
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| − | Movement (Kindle Locations 652-657). Open Road Media. Kindle Edition.
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li></li>
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| − | <li>Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement
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| − | (Kindle Locations 649-652). Open Road Media. Kindle Edition.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement
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| − | (Kindle Locations 645-646). Open Road Media. Kindle Edition.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li></li>
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| − | <li>Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement
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| − | (Kindle Location 645). Open Road Media. Kindle Edition.
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Animal Liberation (1975)</li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Veganism
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li></li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Definitions
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>Utilitarian.
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>A consequentialist moral philosophy which considers the morality of an action is
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| − | determined solely by its utility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all
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| − | sentient beings."
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | <li>Hedonistic Utilitarian.
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| − | <ul>
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| − | <li>A moral philosophy which asserts that the rightness of an action depends entirely on the
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| − | amount of pleasure it tends to produce and the amount of pain it tends to prevent.
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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| − | </li>
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| − | </ul>
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